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Abstract
In this paper we extend to state-owned enterprises the empirical work on investment-cash flow
sensitivities.  Our sample is a panel of Italian state-owned manufacturing firms over the period
1977-1993.  The distinctive element of public firms’ financial environment is the budget regime
under which they operate.  Our analysis of Italian institutions identifies a switch from a soft to a
hard budget constraint regime in 1987, for which a critical determinant was Italy’s attempt to
qualify for EMU.  We estimate a number of models of investment with additional cash flow
terms and test for parameter constancy across budget regimes and the business cycle. We find
that there is a positive correlation between investment and cash flow also for public firms, but
only when the budget regime is soft.  We argue that excessive managerial discretion is likely to
be responsible for this correlation. We also find that the switch to a hard regime brings about an
important change in the investment decisions of this panel of public enterprises.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of managerial discretion on
the investment decisions of firms owned by the state and operating in competitive
industries.
Our methodology consists in drawing from financial economics the framework for
the study of the financing of investment and of the role of capital market imperfections.
We then adapt that approach to take into account some peculiarities of investment
decisions and managerial discretion in public enterprises1.
The positive contribution of public enterprises to the post-war development of some
European economies, such as France and Italy, is well documented (see, for example,
Kumar, 1993, Vernon and Aharoni 1981 and Prodi 1976). This is in contrast to the
equally well-documented  poor performance of state-owned firms in recent decades, not
only in those economies, but also in transition and developing ones. One  important
element contributing to poor results is the possible collusion, perceived on the increase
in the last decades, between public managers and politicians (see, for example, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1994).  In this paper we interpret that collusion as an abuse of managerial
discretion on the part of public enterprises’ managers and we investigate its impact on
public firms’ investment. If managers and politicians collude, vote-maximising
objectives - rather than the maximisation of social welfare - drive public investment.
Therefore, collusion (or corruption) results in wasteful, sub-optimal investment2.
We develop our empirical investigation within the theory of the determinants of
investment decisions under imperfect capital markets and we analyse the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow for a panel of Italian state-owned manufacturing firms over the
period 1977-1993.
A distinctive aspect of the financial environment of public firms is that they
normally operate under a soft budget constraint (Kornai 1996). A soft budget constraint
regime is in place “wherever a funding source - e.g. bank or government - finds it
impossible to keep an enterprise to a fixed budget, i.e., whenever the enterprise can
extract ex post a bigger subsidy or loan than would have been considered efficient ex
                                                
1 “Managerial discretion is the ability of managers to choose and pursue objectives and strategies that
differ from those of the owners” (Aharoni, 1981, p.184). We consider taxpayers to be the owners of
public firms (see Section 3).  In this paper the terms public firms, public enterprises (commonly used in
the public economics literature) and state-owned firms, state-owned enterprises (commonly used in the
transition economics literature) are all used interchangeably to mean firms whose majority shareholder is
the government.  In contrast, we use the term private firms to mean firms not owned by the government
(and not to indicate firms not quoted).
2  See Stultz (1990) for wasteful investment in private firms.
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ante” (Maskin, 1996). Our detailed analysis of Italian institutions confirms this, but only
for the first part of our sample period.  Indeed, our institutional analysis identifies in
1987 a switch from a soft to a hard budget constraint regime for Italian public
enterprises. It also shows how European economic policy played a determinant role in
bringing about that shift in Italy.  Indeed, the requirements to enter the European
Monetary Union and, before that, the discipline imposed by participation in the
European Monetary System and the Single Market Programme pushed the Italian
government towards a much tougher approach to its budget deficit.
The shift of regime allows us to carry out a natural experiment and test for
differences in the investment behaviour of public firms during soft and hard budget
constraint periods.  In particular,  we estimate an accelerator model of investment with
added cash flow terms and test for parameter constancy of the financial factors across
soft and hard budget constraint periods.  Moreover, we analyse the interactions of the
two budget regimes with different stages of the business cycle. For comparative
purposes we present evidence also for private firms.
Because of the peculiarities of public enterprises, we complete the empirical work
by checking the robustness of our results across a number of alternative investment
models: a modified version of the accelerator model, an error correction model, an Euler
equation model, and a “Q” investment model using the “Fundamental Q” of Gilchrist
and Himmelberg (1995).
This paper makes three contributions. First, it extends to state-owned firms the
debate on the source of capital market imperfections that might be responsible for the
well-documented evidence of a positive link between investment and cash flows,
holding constant underlying investment opportunities (see Hubbard 1998). To our
knowledge this is the first study that enlarges that debate and investigates managerial
discretion for enterprises owned by the State, which, after all, is the most important
large shareholder after individual families in most economies (see La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). Second, in doing so, it makes a rigorous contribution to the
currently limited and rather anecdotal evidence on the financial and investment
behaviour of state-owned firms.  Thirdly, it provides sound empirical evidence of the
effects of a shift in budget regimes and, indirectly, of the impact of European economic
integration on public firms’ investment decisions 3.
The paper is divided into eight sections. Section 2 describes the theoretical
framework for the analysis of the correlation between investment and cash flow of
                                                
3 See Bertero and Rondi 1999 for evidence on the effects of a change of regime on public firms’
productivity and employment.
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private firms.  Section 3 investigates how investment decisions and managerial
discretion differ between private and public firms.  Section 4 puts these differences in
the context of Italian institutions and discusses the switch from a soft to a hard budget
regime. Section 5 presents the investment model.  Section 6 describes the dataset.
Section 7 presents the empirical models and the main results. Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2. The theoretical framework for the analysis of company investment
Some recent microeconometric literature has refocused attention on the
determinants of company investment decisions under the assumption of imperfect
capital markets (see the seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). The
theoretical framework for this paper draws from that literature.
Information economics and agency theory provide the theoretical foundations to
explain, with two different interpretations, why empirical research has found that
investment is positively correlated with cash flow or other measures of internal finance,
after controlling for future investment (profit) opportunities4.  One interpretation, the
“financing constraints hypothesis”, explains the investment-cash flow link in terms of
financial constraints arising in imperfect capital markets when investors are less
informed than managers about the quality of the investment project (Myers and Majluf,
1984). With asymmetric information, costly monitoring and contract enforcement
problems, a premium is added to the (unique) perfect markets cost of capital, and
internal and external funds are no longer perfect substitutes. A decrease in current cash
flow, by signalling a decrease in internal net worth, raises the shadow cost of capital,
tightening the financing constraints. This discourages investment and leads to under-
investment. So far, most empirical work in this area has found supporting evidence for
the positive relationship between investment and internal finance by investigating the
investment behaviour of sub-samples of firms selected to be a priori more likely to face
capital-market frictions 5.
                                                
4  On the importance to control for future profit opportunities in investment equations, see Nickell (1978),
Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998).
5  In general, empirical findings tend to be consistent with the idea that financing constraints are more
binding  for firms that are relatively smaller, younger, independent (i.e. not affiliated with business groups
or banks), more technologically innovative, and that have lower dividend pay-out and less concentrated
ownership (see Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay, 1997, Mulkay 1997, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli
2000, Chirinko and Schaller 1995 for recent empirical evidence). For a critical assessment of the
methodology of splitting the sample according to ex-ante criteria, see Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard
(1998). See also: Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for a criticism of the dividend pay-out criteria used by
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) for a reply and Kaplan and
Zingales (2000) for further discussion.
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Another relevant contribution for the study of the impact of financing constraints on
investment, has come recently from the literature on the micro-foundations of
macroeconomics. This literature analyses the alternative channels for the transmission
of monetary policy and investigates the role of changes in credit market conditions in
amplifying monetary shocks (see Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1996). Following a monetary tightening or a downturn in the business cycle,
the negative shock to the firm’s future prospects reduces its internal net worth and the
firm cuts back on investment spending because the terms of credit deteriorate. This
“financial accelerator mechanism” predicts, therefore, that the impact of financing
constraints on company investment decisions is more severe during recessions,
amplifying the economic downturn.
As in the “financing constraints hypothesis”, this mechanism predicts that the
relationship between investment and cash flow should be positive.  However, it refines
it by adding that it should be stronger during recessions and that it should be more
pronounced for firms that find it more difficult to credibly communicate private
information6. Recent tests of the existence of a “financial accelerator mechanism”
combine the cross-section and time-series implications of the theory.  They compare the
investment behaviour both across sub-samples of firms and across recessions and
expansions, under the assumption that the investment cash flow relationship is (more)
counter-cyclical for companies with (more) information and incentive problems7.
A second interpretation of the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow, the
“managerial discretion hypothesis”, highlights the agency problems arising from the
misalignment of managers’ interests and shareholders’ objectives (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982).  In a world of perfect capital markets,
private firms’ investment projects are chosen according to the positive net present value
criterion, with the objective of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  But, when ownership
and control are separated, private firms’ managers enjoy greater discretion in the
decision-making process. As suggested by Jensen (1986)’s “free cash flow theory”, in
this context managers are able to overlook equity holders’ wealth and, for example,
invest in excess of what is needed to finance positive net present value projects. Rather
than paying out dividends to shareholders, they would use cash flows to maximise their
personal reputation and perquisites. Moreover, when ownership is not only separated
                                                
6  This so-called  “flight to quality” of credit refers to the reallocation of credit from low-net-worth to
high-net-worth borrowers in downturns. See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996).
7  See, for the US, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox (1993), and, for Italy, Rondi, Sack, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1998) and Rondi and
Sembenelli (1999) respectively on aggregate data and panel data.
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from control but also dispersed - e.g. in widely held quoted firms - the literature shows
that the existence of free riding shareholders exacerbates managers’ discretion (see Hart
1995).  For firms with the severe agency problems assumed by the ownership-control
separation hypothesis, the observed positive correlation between investment and cash
flow, “could reflect managers’ decisions to ignore signals from market valuation in
favour of over-investment in growth” 8 (Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, 1995, p. 685).
A comparison between the financing constraints and the managerial discretion
interpretations of the investment-cash flow positive correlation highlights that both
consider internal and external finance imperfect substitutes. Both predict that changes in
internal resources forecast changes in investment spending, holding constant firms’
investment opportunities. Both assume that higher leverage implies more risk of
financial distress and more risk of bankruptcy. However, they differ on the source of the
capital markets imperfections. The “financing constraints hypothesis” focuses on
asymmetric/hidden information problems, whereas the “managerial discretion
hypothesis” focuses on agency/incentive problems resulting from the separation of
ownership and control. As a consequence, although they both predict a wedge between
the cost of internal and external funds, the cost of external finance is too high for the
financing constraints/asymmetric information view, whereas the cost of internal finance
is too low for the managerial discretion/agency cost explanation9. Hence, from the
observed excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow, the former predicts under-
investment and the latter over-investment.
This pattern of conflicting predictions persists once we transpose the analysis in the
macroeconomic/business cycle context. Whereas the “financial accelerator/financing
constraints hypothesis” predicts that the correlation between investment and internal
finance is counter-cyclical, we argue that the impact of managerial discretion over the
cycle may lead to a pro-cyclical relationship, stronger during booms and weaker during
recessions (see also Rondi and Sembenelli, 1999). This is because managerial discretion
itself can be thought to be pro-cyclical. When things go well, during booms, cash flows
are higher, agency problems are, possibly, less evident to shareholders and their
monitoring of managers less tight. This, in turn, implies more discretion and (more)
over-investment.  When things turn bad, agency conflicts sharpen, managers’ discretion
decreases and the opportunities to misallocate cash flow are reduced10.
                                                
8 This argument has been used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to describe the investment decisions of
“financially unconstrained” companies. See also Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995), Carpenter (1995)
and Gugler (1997) for other attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses.
9  See Kathuria and Mueller (1995)  on  this point.
10 This suggests, however, that there is another point on which the managerial discretion and the financing
constraints hypotheses agree:  that recessions do play a disciplinary role and induce firms to reduce
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3. Investment decisions and managerial discretion in public firms
We have seen that imperfections in capital markets affect investment decisions and
lead to a different pattern of explanations of their relationship with cash flows
depending on whether firms are thought to be more afflicted by asymmetric
information/financing constraints problems or by agency costs/managerial discretion
problems.  This section explores how these two problems apply to public enterprises.
Although even state firms are likely to have a pecking order in terms of cost of
funds, they are generally considered “financially unconstrained” and much less
dependent than private firms on the availability of internal resources.  Indeed, the
common view is that external finance for public enterprises is dominated by state grants
and guaranteed loans, with no risk of default and no risk of bankruptcy.  In many
countries, including Italy, public firms are not even legally obliged to pay out dividends
to the state-shareholder.   In other words, in the context of the empirical work testing the
“financing constraints hypothesis” (Fazzari et al., 1988), public enterprises could belong
to a sub-sample of  “the ultimately unconstrained firms” (see Kaplan and Zingales,
1997).  And, if that paradigm holds, their investment should be independent of cash
flow.
However, in Bertero and Rondi (1999) we show that, when public firms operate
under a hard budget constraint regime, they do respond to financial pressure by
increasing productivity and reducing employment. Consequently, public firms’
behaviour can be affected by financial factors and the above view that public firms are
financially unconstrained is only appropriate when these firms operate under a soft
budget constraint.
Once adjustments are made to take into account the different and more complex
context in which public managers operate, the managerial discretion hypothesis is, on
the other hand, of great relevance for public enterprises. The equivalent for public firms
of  the maximisation-of-shareholders’-wealth objective is the maximisation of a more
complex social welfare function,  which is a combination of two constrained objectives.
The first is exactly the same as for private firms and is the maximisation of taxpayers’
wealth, driven by the profit and efficiency motive.  The second, a direct consequence of
the mandate of public firms (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1989), is the fulfilment of the
industrial or economic policy objectives - set by the government - of growth and
employment maximisation and regional development.  An important implication of the
pursuit of this objective – and we come back to it below and in the next section - is that
public investment is likely to be counter-cyclical.
                                                                                                                                              
wasteful investment.
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The equivalent for public firms of the pursuit of private firms managers’ own
objectives is again more complex and made up of two discretionary components.  The
first is the pursuit of managers’ personal perquisites, again the same as for private firms.
The second, most important for this paper, is the pursuit of what we call  party-political
objectives (which should not be confused with the policy objectives above). These are
the objectives that are driven by collusion between managers and politicians and are
motivated by vote-maximising.  They are the ones modelled in Shleifer and Vishny
(1994)’s work.  Chart 1 summarises the private and public managers’ types of
objectives.
Chart 1.   Managers’ objectives
Managers of private firms Managers of public enterprises
1.Maximisation of taxpayers’ wealthConstrained objectives
Maximisation of shareholders’ wealth
2. Maximisation of government policy
objectives (e.g. employment and
regional development)
1.Maximisation of personal benefitsDiscretionary objectives
Maximisation of personal benefits
2. Maximisation of party- political
objectives (collusion with politicians)
Two points are worth noting. First, due to the multiple and often partly conflicting
objectives that it entails, the maximisation of social welfare is more complex than the
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth.  The relevant consequence for this study is that
the discretion in the hand of public firms’  managers has more dimensions than that of
private firms’ managers11.  Multiple and unclear objectives, complex performance
measurements, greater choice of determining primary and secondary goals, all allow
more room for manoeuvre and a greater temptation to pursue party-political aims and
collusion.
                                                
11 For example, the maximisation of growth satisfies different objectives for managers of private and
public firms.  Whereas for private firms’  managers, in the standard finance literature, growth
maximisation is only equated with empire building and excessive managerial discretion, the pursuit of
growth for public firms managers is often part of the maximisation of social welfare.  So, it is sometimes
difficult to disentangle when growth for state firms maximises taxpayers’ wealth or managers’ private
benefits, and when these two objectives are in conflict.
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Second, because of the extreme form of dispersed ownership of public firms, their
managers, exactly like managers of widely-held firms with free riding problems, enjoy
little direct monitoring by shareholders. The ultimate financial owners of public firms in
their chain of principals are the taxpayers, in the interest of whom social welfare and
wealth should be maximised.  However, taxpayers have no direct contractual property
rights (see Tirole 1994), only indirect influence through the election of a government
which, itself, acts as principal for state-owned firms12.  Taxpayers do not have any
direct control on management and have to leave monitoring to other institutions.  This,
as in the case of widely-held private firms with free riding problems, results in a greater
likelihood of abuse of managerial discretion.
In conclusion, the discretion that public managers enjoy - and the possibility of
abusing it – is, in substance, similar to that of private firms’ managers.  However, given
that their discretion arises from a more articulated set of objectives and given the
relevance of the budget regime for the financial behaviour of public firms, its effect on
the relationship between investment and cash flow and the related predictions reported
in Section 2 need to be refined.
We discussed that for this study it is important to take into account the budget
regime under which public managers operate.  “The budget constraint is soft if the state
helps the firm out of trouble. There are various means to do so: subsidies; individual
exemption of taxes or other charges…; prolongation of the due credit payment, etc. The
state is a universal insurance company which compensates the damaged sooner or later
for every loss. The paternalistic state guarantees automatically the survival of the firm…
the hardness or softness of the budget constraint reflects an attitude… [It] is an ex-ante
behavioural regularity, which exerts an influence on the firms’ decision” (quoted in
Schmidt, 1996 from Kornai, 1979).  The softness/hardness of the constraint can be of
different degrees and can also change over time.  Kornai (1996) discusses how the more
the budget constraint moves towards a harder constraint, the more public firms are
subject to financial discipline. If the firm operates in a soft budget regime, it is likely
that managerial discretion is high.  The financial freedom translates in the possibility of
pursuing the discretionary objectives and to collude with politicians. Therefore, under
the “managerial discretion/agency problems hypothesis”, the prediction is that the
positive relationship between investment and cash flow should be stronger under a soft
budget constraint.
                                                
12 Although, to be precise, the government ownership rights are exercised, in turn, through multiple
principals in the form of different ministries (see Tirole 1994).
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Also of interest is the interaction of the two budget regimes with the different stages
of the business cycle.  In this context, the prediction of a pro-cyclical managerial
discretion and  investment-cash flow relationship, discussed in Section 2, may not be
appropriate for public firms.  If the economy is hit by a recession, vote-seeking
investment projects or initiatives to maintain or increase long term political support
become more rewarding for politicians because more valuable to local voters. In a soft
budget regime, therefore, collusion between public managers and politicians becomes
both more tempting and more likely. Consequently, in downturns, investment would be
even more sensitive to cash flow than during booms.  This could possibly result in a
counter-cyclical relationship between investment and cash flow for public firms
operating under a soft budget constraint.
If, however, public firms experience a tightening of the budget constraint, we know
that they respond to financial pressure (see Bertero and Rondi 1999).  In other words, if,
for example, budgetary requirements become a political priority and the stance of the
fiscal policy becomes tighter, in both constrained and discretionary objectives the room
for manoeuvre disappears.  Public managers not only lose the discretion necessary for
indulging in collusive behaviour, but are also less able to invest in counter-cyclical - for
example growth-oriented – policy objectives.  This in turn leads us to predict a weaker
(i.e. pro-cyclical) correlation between investment and cash flow when public firms
operate in a hard budget environment. In Figure 1 we present a graphical depiction of
the investment-cash flow correlation for private and public firms under the hypothesis
of managerial discretion.
4. Italian public firms, managerial discretion and budget regimes
To investigate the quality and quantity of abuse of managerial discretion, we split
the history of Italian public enterprises13 into three distinct periods: 1930s-1960s, 1970-
1987, 1988 until now.  Direct public intervention started in the 1930s with a number of
rescue operations of distressed banks and of the manufacturing firms these banks owned
(see De Cecco and Giavazzi, 1993 and Barca, 1997).  The idea was to restructure firms
and banks as parts of a new, diversified holding company (IRI, Institute for Industrial
                                                
13 As in other European countries, public enterprises in Italy play a major role in the
economy accounting for around 15 percent of the non-agricultural labour force, 20
percent of value added and 25 percent of fixed investments (1991 data).  The public
sector controls around 70 percent of banking assets and has a major presence in many
industries, services and, of course, utilities. Parts of this section draw from the
institutional analysis in Bertero and Rondi (1999).
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Reconstruction) and then, eventually, reinstate private ownership.  After World War II,
the original rescue plan was extended to promote reconstruction and to develop a full
industrial policy plan of direct intervention. Two other holding companies were created,
ENI (oil and gas sector) in 1953 and EFIM (mechanical engineering and mining sectors)
in 1962.  Saraceno (1977) makes the important point that “the political justification of
this action was neither the intention to put a stop to private monopolies nor to give an
impetus to certain industrial productions nor to develop depressed areas.  Instead, the
inability of the private sector to supply the risk capital required for controlling important
industrial enterprises from sources other than commercial banks was the compelling
factor for government intervention. (...)  Thus, a certain pragmatism became associated
with the state-held enterprises that was to remain for the life of the system”.
This system of state holdings makes Italian public enterprises particularly
interesting for the study of managerial discretion and of the relationship between public
managers and politicians. Whereas a nationalised industry is a direct instrument of
government policy operating outside market rules, Italian state holdings were meant to
operate within market conditions, in competitive sectors, with the equity participation of
private shareholders (in some cases) and with the aim of safeguarding the independence
of managers from the political system.  Managers were outsiders with respect to
political circles and were allowed to concern themselves primarily with profitability and
efficiency (Barca, 1997, p. 548).  The economic and public policy objectives were
added by the government and had to be incorporated into final decisions (Saraceno,
1977). The interaction between managers’ and government objectives is summarised by
Grassini (1981): “In general, parliament decides a policy, provides funds and sets a limit
on the extent to which a state-owned firm can try to maximise its profits”.  In this initial
setup, the scope for abuse of managerial discretion and related collusion with politicians
was limited.
The legal setup of state holdings, still in place today, reflected these principles.
Italian public ownership is organised in state-owned holding companies, in turn with
controlling interests in diversified sub-holdings.  These own individual enterprises, in
some cases with minority private shareholders (see Chart 2). The sub-holdings are
mostly incorporated as private joint-stock corporations, are governed by private
commercial law, follow a private accounting system and operate in a variety of
competitive industries.  The database for the empirical investigation of public
enterprises in this study is constructed from the balance sheets of a sample of these
individual firms.
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Chart 2.  Corporate governance of Italian public enterprises
During the first period (1930s-1960s) public firms were, by and large, profitable
and operated as described above.  Abuse of the discretionary managerial objectives
described in Chart 1 was rare.  An extensive literature, particularly by British scholars,
such as Shonfield (1965), Posner and Wolf (1967) and Holland (1972), praised the
management of these firms for their substantial contribution to the recovery of the
Italian economy after World War II and also, paradoxically, for reinforcing competition
(Martinelli 1981).  The establishment in 1956 of a Ministry for State-Holdings with the
mandate of spelling out the political objectives for public enterprises, was meant to
separate the political from the profitability objectives.  The idea was to create a filter
between politicians and firms to preserve the independence of the latter (Saraceno,
1977, p. 426; Scognamiglio, 1981).
In the 1970s and 1980s, our second period, things changed.  Other institutions set
up in the late 1960s to reinforce that filter, did not produce the outcome for which they
were  intended. For example, in 1967 an Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic
Planning (CIPE) was established, with the mandate to set economic and social
objectives and determine investment policy for public enterprises. The Ministry for
State-holdings, in turn, would translate these strategic guidelines into operational
objectives for the public holdings.
However, the governance of public enterprises became excessively complicated
(see Chart 2) and whereas the institutional mechanisms through which the
government/shareholder communicated its objectives to firms became more transparent,
a party-political “hidden shareholder” emerged (Scognamiglio, 1981).  This, together
Individual firm
(e.g. Alfa Romeo)
Automobile industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. FiNMECCANICA)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Individual firm
(e.g. Motta)
Food industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. SME)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Financial services sub-holdings
(e.g. Banca Commerciale Italiana)
Other individual firms
Other sub-holdings
Holding (e.g. IRI)
100% state owned
Ministry of State Holdings
Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE)
Taxpayers/voters
Government
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with a deteriorating world economy and other factors14, resulted in a period, between
1970 and 1987, of party-political  interference in the management of public enterprises
(Grassini, 1981).  Political influence deeply affected strategic decisions, such as the
location of new plants and appointment of top management. The 1978 law (L. 14/78)
formally gave a Parliamentary committee the role of appointing the Chairmen and Vice-
Chairmen of public enterprises.  This implicitly legitimated the nomination of top
management on the basis of an equal allocation to the relevant political parties, rather
than on the basis of competence (Grassini, 1981); for example, by tradition, IRI and
ENI, the two major state holdings used to be “controlled” by Christian Democrats and
Socialists, respectively.  All this made also the removal of top management a rather
complicated political battle.  Consequently, between 1965 and 1980, for example, only
three Presidents were appointed at IRI.
The interaction of the above institutional changes and of two important
characteristics of the post-war Italian political system -  the high stability of the
governing party and the high instability of governments themselves – favoured a
climate of corruption and collusion.  The succession of short-lived coalition
governments, made of permutations of the same politicians belonging to the same large
party (Christian Democrats) and a few small ones, eased the transfer of economic policy
decisions from the elected government to the chairman of political parties and, more
importantly, to the heads of  party factions bargaining over the formation of coalitions
(Filippi, 1975).  All this brought about wide abuse of managerial discretion in public
firms, particularly in the form of vote-maximising investment decisions to satisfy party
and party-factions political objectives.  Moreover, in 1974, a new law for the financing
of political parties made illegal the direct and explicit financing of political parties and
factions by public enterprises.  Although the law aimed at preventing collusive
behaviour, its effect was to eliminate the transparency of party financing and to
encourage indirect and hidden contributions by managers to politicians in exchange of
favours.
By the end of the 1970s, which is when our database starts, public firms’
performance was characterised by poor profitability (in some cases huge losses), low
productivity and high debt. In order to keep these firms in business, government funds
were made available to state holdings, and redistributed to individual firms, through
various sources.  Among these were endowment funds (fondi di dotazione), which were
used to recapitalise equity or for new investment. Losses were also financed with new
                                                
14For example, following the first oil shock, political and social pressures pushed state holding companies
into acquiring further collapsing private companies, a procedure which contributed to fostering direct
political interference and collusion.
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bank debt, often provided by banks publicly-owned themselves. In addition, the effects
of a number of ill-conceived laws became apparent.  An example is the 1977 law (L. n.
675/77) which required state firms to estimate the shadow costs (oneri impliciti) they
incurred by implementing “non-economic objectives”.  These costs were then
subsidised by the Treasury, a procedure which lent itself to abuse.
It is easy to see how, during the second period (1970-1987), given these
circumstances, the budget constraint under which public enterprises operated became
soft. Accommodating endowment funds, high debt, political interference and collusion
between public managers and politicians, all contributed to create an environment that
fits the Kornai definition of a soft budget constraint regime in a mixed economy
discussed in Section 3.
However, that soft budget regime was put under pressure in the third period (1987-
1990s) by a number of economic and political factors.  In particular, a determinant role
was played by the process towards European integration.  With a mounting level of
public debt, the attempt of Italy to qualify for the European Monetary Union and the EU
pressure to reduce state aid and to accelerate the privatization programme triggered
major changes and contributed to new and strong financial pressure on public
enterprises15. They also led to changes in the relationship between public managers and
politicians16.
As discussed in detail in Bertero and Rondi (1999), an analysis of these changes
allows us to identify a switch to a hard budget regime in 1987. This is the first year in
which the restructuring of Italian public enterprises included the closure of plants and
lines of production and even the dismissal of management17.  The drastic reorganization
of FINSIDER -  an IRI sub-holding and sector holding itself of the steel industry – and
the liquidation of EFIM  - the third largest state holding – finalised in 1991, are example
of this new policy which made public enterprises’ managers experience for the first time
a threat similar to that of bankruptcy or take-over.  1987 is also the  year in which an
                                                
15 Another political factor to consider is that, in the case of Italy, excessive government spending gave
rise to an anti-central government federal movement particularly vociferous in its complaints of allegedly
unfair distribution of government funds between North and South.  This kind of phenomenon may be
related to the pressures towards decentralization described by Qian and Roland (1998), which contribute
to a hardening of the budget constraint for public organizations.
16 As widely reported in the international press, a combination of these factors and the unacceptable level
of corruption in the overall political system led in the early 1990s to a reform of the voting system and to
a revolution in the Italian political system.
17 These policies, started at the end of the 1980s, resulted, during the 1990s, in new management
structures and new procedures for the replacement of top management, based on performance and other
related criteria (see Lo Passo and Macchiati, 1997 for evidence on management turnover in individual
holdings).
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°10/2000
20
appropriate quantitative measure of government easy financing of public enterprises, i.e.
total endowment funds, collapsed. After reaching a peak of 1.08 percent of GDP in
1983, endowment funds shrank to 0.46 percent of GDP in 1985 and then collapsed to
0.09 percent of GDP in 1987. Finally, 1987 is the first year of implementation of the
Single Market Program18.  Our empirical work exploits the 1987 structural break, which
provides an instrument for a unique natural experiment.
5. The investment model:  an accelerator specification
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of financial factors in the
investment decisions of a panel of state-owned firms.  Given the complexities of these
firms, for our main empirical model of company investment we choose a simple
accelerator model19, as derived from the solution of the profit maximisation problem of
the firm, in the absence of adjustment costs on the production factors (labour, L and
capital stock, K).   In Section 7.2 we then check the robustness of our main results by
estimating a number of alternative investment models.
Following Jorgenson (1963), we derive an investment equation by maximising net
worth and calculating the marginal productivity of capital.  We find that the equilibrium
condition for profit maximisation requires that the marginal productivity of capital stock
equals the real user cost of capital, Jit.
In particular, in the profit maximization equation we use the following constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function:
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where Y is the firm’s output, s is the elasticity of substitution and u is the returns to
scale parameter.  Taking logs and finding the first order condition for Kt, we obtain the
following long run equilibrium condition for the desired capital stock as a function of
real output and cost of capital:
                                                
18 Interestingly, 1987 is the year in which, for the first time, a political party advocating the particular
federalist views described in footnote 15 managed to have candidates in the parliamentary elections.
19 In using this widely tested model, we follow the approach of Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay
(1997).  See also Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999).
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where kit  is the log of capital stock, yit is the log of real output and jit is the log of real
cost of capital .
To ensure proportionality between capital stock and demand, we must either
assume  u=1 (constant returns to scale) or s=1 (unit elasticity of substitution). If we
assume constant returns to scale and s=0, we obtain a Leontief production function and
a simple accelerator model, where the capital is not affected by the user cost of capital.
If we assume s=1, the CES production function is not defined due to the zero in the
denominator of the exponent. However as s à 1 the CES function approximates a
Cobb-Douglas production function.  In this case the capital stock depends positively on
demand and negatively on the cost of capital. Taking first differences, and assuming
that Dkit can be approximated by the investment rate Iit/Kit, we obtain the basic
investment equation
I
K
y jit
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To account for slow adjustment of the actual capital stock to the desired capital
stock, we then add dynamics to the basic equation in the form of lagged investment rate
(I/K) and lagged growth rate of real sales (Dyi ). We assume that the variation in the
user cost of capital as well as firm specific trends in the capital and output growth rates
are captured by time-specific, at, and firm-specific, ai, effects. e it is the error term. The
basic specification is then:
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To test for the presence of financial effects, we then add to the basic specification
the current and lagged cash flow to capital ratios (Cit/Kit).
As it is well known, much of the debate over the role of cash flow for investment is
about the fact that cash flow may also be a forecasting variable for future investment
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opportunities20. In the absence of controls for expectational influences, the significance
of  cash flow terms is difficult to interpret. The positive correlation between investment
and cash flow may occur because of the effect of financial factors on investment, but
also just simply because information on cash flow helps to forecast output and therefore
capital spending. In the empirical literature, the difficulty is to construct a proxy for the
firm’s investment opportunities.
The standard approach to isolate the information content of cash flow would be to
use Tobin’s Q.  However, apart from the common criticism of this approach that the
average observed Q may be a poor proxy for marginal Q, a more basic problem makes it
unsuitable for our sample of state-owned firms:  they are mostly unquoted.
An alternative methodology by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) avoids using
stock prices and (noisy) information from financial markets by constructing investment
fundamentals (Fundamental Q), based on forecasted future profitability, using a vector
autoregression (VAR) forecasting framework21.
Another approach to deal with the lack of stock market data, or measurement
problems in the construction of Q, is to model the investment decisions by using the
Euler equation which describes the firm’s choice of optimal capital stock, under the
assumption of perfect capital markets (see, for example, Bond and Meghir, 1994).  An
advantage of this framework is that rejection by the data  of the standard Euler equation
can be reconciled with the presence of financing constraints when proxies for changes
in net worth have a role in the investment decision. However, as several authors have
pointed out, the Euler approach as well has a number of drawbacks (e.g. difficult
comparability of results with the reduced form literature, poor small samples properties,
high sensitivity of the results to the specification). In addition, as it is based on the
firm’s inter-temporal first-order conditions, the Euler equation may fail to detect
violations of the frictionless model for classes of firms whose overall level of
investment is constrained by internal finance throughout the period (and not period-by-
period)22.  Beside these drawbacks, which have made it less popular among researchers
in recent years23, we do not consider the Euler approach - with its set of fragile
assumptions, often too restrictive even for private firms – the obvious framework for
investigating state-owned firms’ investment decisions.
                                                
20 See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for a thorough discussion on this issue.
21 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) extend to a panel data setting the idea developed for time series by
Abel and Blanchard (1986).
22 See Schiantarelli (1996), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Hubbard (1998).
23 See, for example, Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999).
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Returning to our choice of empirical model of investment, to control for the firm’s
investment opportunities (i.e. for the possibility that information on cash flow helps to
forecast output, hence investment), we include in equation (4) the future growth rates of
real demand, measured by the first and second lead of the log difference of production
in two-digit NACE industries, Dyjt+1 , Dyjt+2  (see Rondi and Sembenelli, 1999).
Therefore, our final specification is:
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where Ct/Kt and Ct-1/Kt-1 are the current and lagged cash flow to capital ratio.  Cash flow
is defined as value added less labour cost, taxes and interest expenses.
In the empirical investigation in Section 7.1 we use this adjusted accelerator model
allowing the coefficient on cash flow to vary between soft and hard budget regimes (see
Section 4) and over the business cycle.  We then test for parameter constancy across
political and macroeconomic conditions.  In Section 7.2 we then check the robustness of
the results obtained with equation (5) by using a number of alternative specifications
based on the other approaches described in this section.
6. Data and descriptive statistics
The database is an unbalanced panel constructed at CERIS using the balance sheet
data collected by Mediobanca investment bank 24.  The panel includes manufacturing
companies, both state and privately owned, over the period 1977-1993.  Reflecting the
standard ownership pattern of Italian firms, most of these firms are not quoted.  As a
consequence we cannot construct a measure of Tobin’s Q from financial markets data.
The panel includes only firms with at least five consecutive observations, so that each
firm has a time series of at least five and at most seventeen years. The five-year
                                                
24  Firms are included in the yearly directory Le Principali Società Italiane (Mediobanca) on the basis of
their size. Between 1977 and 1984, firms with sales greater than Lit 10bn (£3.3mn) were included,
between 1985 and 1986, firms with sales of at least Lit 20bn (£6.6mn) and between 1987 and 1993, firms
with sales of at least Lit 25bn (£8.3mn). Firm level data on fixed capital investment is not directly
available in this dataset. Therefore investment is calculated as the difference in fixed capital assets. In
turn, the replacement value capital stock series is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. 1982
was chosen as the benchmark year because in this year the “Visentini bis accounting law” required firms
to evaluate the capital stock at replacement prices. For a complete description of the methodology and the
database see Margon et al. (1995).
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requirement is appropriate for the dynamic specification we use in the econometric
section, which involves  first-differencing, as well as lagging,  most variables.
Firms are classified according to their ownership, which can change over time in
either direction, from state-owned to private or viceversa (i.e. firms are allowed to
transit between private and public ownership). Moreover, each firm is allocated to its
primary industry defined according to the three-digit NACE-REV. 0 classification.
Finally, whenever a major operation occurs such as mergers, acquisitions, or divestures,
by construction the panel drops the observation for that year and breaks up the time
series because that observation is unlikely to be comparable with the previous and
following one.
For our empirical work, we separate the original panel into two sub-samples of state
and private enterprises. The sub-samples consists of 150 state companies and 1168
private companies with  1278 and 9877 firm-year observations, respectively. On
average state-owned firms are larger that private firms. The median public firm has Lit
49.2bn (£16.4mn) of real sales (in 1980 Lire) when it enters the sample, whereas the
media private firms has 36.5 (£12.2mn). Measured in terms of employees, the median
state firm has 884 workers (upon entry) and the private firm has 413.  As described in
Section 4,  we choose 1987 as the turning point for the shift from soft to hard budget
regimes. Also, our sample period includes two recessions, in years 1981-1982 and
1990-199325.  We define the remaining years as expansion years. On the basis of these
definitions we construct five time dummies to be used in the econometric analysis:
SOFTt, HARDt, REC1t, EXPt, REC2t.
Table 1a presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables for the panel of
public firms for the entire period, for the soft and hard budget constraint periods, and
for the upturn and downturns of the business cycle.  We report the descriptive statistics
for the investment to capital stock ratio (I/K) and the cash flow to capital stock ratio
(C/K)26.  For comparative purposes, in Table 1b we report the same statistics for the
panel of private firms.
Differences between soft and hard regimes are not particularly informative, with the
median increasing during the hard years, but the third quartile decreasing in the same
period.  A comparison of investment ratios across the business cycle shows that the
requirement for public firms to invest counter-cyclically – discussed in Section 3 - is
confirmed by the data. Except for firms in the first quartile, the investment ratio is
                                                
25 Recession periods are defined using the Bank of Italy’s Annual Reports.
26 We use end of period capital stock as a scale, as is done in other works using Italian data. This is done
to minimise the serious distortion that could be introduced in the series by the high and variable Italian
inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s.
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higher during the recessions, especially for highly investing companies. More
interestingly, the comparison between the earlier recession (in the “soft years”) and the
later one (in the “hard years”) shows that the investment rates were much lower in the
second downturn. This suggests that the shift in regime had an influence on the decision
to pursue counter-cyclical investment policies, with public firms no longer performing
their counter-cyclical role.
Turning to the cash flow to capital stock ratio, we find that Italian state firms are in
line with the well-documented, generally poor performance of public enterprises27.  The
comparison with private firms highlights this.  The median cash flow rates for public
firms are low and the first quartile ones are negative in every sub-period. However, the
third quartile cash flow rates, compared to private firms’ median profitability, are
satisfactory.  As expected, the cash flow rates for state companies are much lower in the
earlier recession than in the expansion period, but not in the later recession. Finally, in
the hard budget constraint period, state firms appear to perform better than in the soft
period.
7. Empirical investigation and results
7.1. The accelerator model specification
In this section we investigate the impact of managerial discretion on the investment
decisions of the panel of Italian state-owned firms over the period 1977-1993.  This
period not only includes the above-mentioned structural break, but also an entire
business cycle, with the first recession occurring during the soft budget period and the
second during the hard regime years.  Our methodology consists in estimating the
adjusted accelerator model with added cash flow terms derived in Section 5, equation
(5), and in investigating the correlation between investment and cash flow.  We then
explore how this correlation varies across the soft and hard budget periods and over the
business cycle.  For comparative purposes we also report results for private firms.
For estimation we use the DPD program by Arellano and Bond (1991, 1998),
designed for dynamic panel data. Table 2 reports the results from the Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM) first-differences one-step estimator, which eliminates the
firm-specific effects by first-differencing the equations, and then uses lagged values of
                                                
27 Other, unreported, descriptive statistics also show that Italian public firms tend to be much more highly
leveraged than private firms. The long and short term financial debt to capital stock ratio for the entire
period is 61.4% for public firms and 38.1% for private firms.  The debt ratios for state companies are
highest during the recessions, especially the one occurring in the soft budget period (150%). However, the
less leveraged firms of the first quartile, decrease their debt ratios during the hard budget years, from 35%
to 25.6%, only ten percentage points higher than private firms in the same quartile.
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endogenous variables as instruments28. To check for absence of serial correlation in the
residuals, we use the M1 and M2 tests for first- and second-order correlation (Arellano
and Bond, 1991) and report them for all equations. If the error term in levels is serially
uncorrelated, after first-differencing,  first-order, but not second-order serial correlation,
is to be expected and instruments dated t-2 and earlier should be valid. If we find
second-order serial correlation, then only instruments dated t-3 are valid. To control for
correlation between the instruments and the error term, we also report a Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958 and Hansen, 1982). In all equations we add
time dummies to capture, among other things, the variation in the user cost of capital
(see Section 5).
In Table 2 we present the results for public firms. For comparison, in Table 3 we
report the results for private firms.  Column (1) of both tables reports the estimated
coefficients for the basic specification, as outlined in equation (5). For both public and
private firms, lagged investment is positive, significant and of  similar magnitude.  Real
sales growth is positive and significant, consistent with accelerator effects. The point
estimate is larger for private firms. As noted in Section 5, we include future growth
rates of industry production as a control for ex-post realisations of investment
opportunities.  Although only the second one for private firms, both leads of industry
production for public firms enter positively. Overall, these results show sufficient
underlying robustness of  the estimated accelerator specification.  We now turn to the
relevant results from this paper’s point of view.
The first new result is that the estimated coefficient on the current cash flow to
capital stock ratio is positive and significant not only for private firms, as one would
expect, but also for public firms.  This shows that the excess sensitivity of investment to
cash flow, reported in the microeconometric literature for private firms, characterises
also public enterprises. As discussed in Section 2, the finding of a positive correlation
between investment and cash flow is consistent with two explanations. On one hand,
under the assumption of information asymmetries in the capital markets, the positive
coefficient may reveal that firms face financing constraints when they have to resort to
external finance, leading them to under-invest. On the other, under the assumption of
“free cash flow”/managerial discretion, it suggests that managers with ample discretion,
obtaining their personal benefits for example from empire-building or collusion with
politicians, are strongly motivated to over-invest in growth.
                                                
28  We treat all right-hand side variables in the investment equation (1) as potentially endogenous. As
instruments we use variables dated t-2 and t-3.  Unreported OLS and Within Groups estimates suggest the
presence of significant firm-specific effects.
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We now move to the core results of the paper. The long-standing debate on the
meaning of a positive cash-flow coefficient in investment equations (after controlling
for future investment opportunities) has been investigated mainly by testing the
statistical significance of the difference between cash flow coefficients across a-priory
groupings of firms.  To investigate the meaning of the positive coefficient for state-
owned firms we focus on the relative magnitudes of the cash flow coefficients across
sub-periods.  We discussed in Section 3 how state firms are more likely to be afflicted
by agency problems than by financing constraints.  One way to test this hypothesis is to
investigate whether the role of financial factors for state companies’ investment changes
during soft and hard budget constraint periods.  Our research strategy consists in
allowing the cash flow coefficient to vary over time and test ex-ante expectations on its
sign and size over the two different periods.
In column (2) of Tables 2 and 3 the cash flow to capital stock ratio is interacted
with two year dummies, one for the soft and one for the hard budget regime. The former
takes value one from 1977 to 1987, the latter takes value one from 1988 onwards. The
results in Table 2 show that the cash flow coefficient for the soft budget years, CF/Kit
SOFTt, is positive and significant and that the one for the hard years, CF/Kit HARDt , is
not significantly different from zero. Also, CF/Kit SOFTt is significantly larger than
CF/Kit HARDt (t=1.6).  This positive and significant relationship between investment
and cash flow during the soft years is consistent with the predictions of the managerial
discretion hypothesis.  In a soft budget regime managers have the widest discretion on
the allocation of cash flow to investment spending.  Consistently, the results also show
that, when the regime hardens after 1987, that relationship is no longer there.
Conversely, the prediction of the financing constraint hypothesis is that there should be
no correlation between cash flow and investment during the soft regime, because in that
regime public firms are thought to be financially unconstrained. In conclusion, these
results show that the shift in the budget regime has an important effect on the
investment decisions of state-owned enterprises.
The parallel results for private firms are presented in Table 3.  The cash flow
coefficients are both small and positive (although the coefficient in the soft years is not
significant).
The difference in the response of investment spending to financial factors across the
two regimes and the fact that, of the two recessions included in the sample, the first
occurred during the soft years and the second during the hard years, provide a
motivation to further the investigation into testing the financial accelerator hypothesis.
We introduce a year dummy for each of the two recessions and for the expansion
periods (REC1t takes the value one for the years 1981-1982 and REC2t for 1990-1993;
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the expansion dummy, EXPt, is one in all other years. In column (3) in Table 2 we allow
the cash flow coefficient to vary across the two recessions and the upturn. This exercise
also enables us to check whether public firms were able to comply with the policy goal
of investing counter-cyclically during a recession independently of the budget regime.
The empirical evidence is less clear-cut than before, but nonetheless informative.
What is of interest is the comparison of the relative magnitude and sign of the three
interacted cash flow coefficients. The coefficient for the cash flow in the economic
upturn, CF/Kit EXPt, is  positive and significant, but smaller than the coefficient for
CF/Kit REC1t (not significant). Most of the upturn years and all of the first downturn
years fall during the soft budget regime, when managerial discretion is high, and, as we
expect, the correlation between investment and cash flow is high. However, the relative
magnitudes of CF/Kit REC1t and CF/Kit EXPt   suggest a counter-cyclical relationship,
consistent with our hypothesis in Section 3 that, if a downturn occurs when the budget
constraint is soft, there is greater likelihood of abuse of managerial discretion, i.e. of
collusion between managers and politicians interested in exploiting the economic
downturn to secure votes in the long term.  This translates in a higher correlation
between investment and cash flow.  The negative coefficient in the second recession,
CF/Kit REC2t (also not significant) suggests that the counter-cyclical role of public
investment became more difficult to pursue once the budget constrain became more
binding.
In contrast to the findings for public firms, the results for private firms in Table 3,
column (3), suggest that the “financial accelerator-cum-financing constraints
hypothesis” is supported by empirical evidence for the sample of private firms. During
the two recessions investment is correlated with cash flow.  Both CF/Kit REC1t and
CF/Kit REC2t are positive, significant and significantly larger than CF/Kit EXPt.
Interestingly, the point estimates for the first recession is significantly larger than the
coefficient for the second recession. This is consistent with the fact that, during the first
recession, the fall in GDP and industrial output was more pronounced.
On the whole, the empirical findings show that the investment-cash flow
relationship for this panel of state companies over time is likely to be due to the
existence of managerial discretion/incentive problems leading firms to over-invest
during the years which we define as “soft”, when these firms were, for the most part,
financially unconstrained (see Section 3). Consistently with this interpretation, we find
that the switch from a soft to a hard budget constraint results in a change of the impact
of cash flow over investment.  This suggests that public managers become more
cautious in their investment decisions.
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7.2. Alternative model specifications.
Because of the complexities of public enterprises discussed in Section 3, we want to
check further the robustness of our results, particularly those regarding the relevance of
cash flow on investment across the two budget regimes.  We therefore extend and
complete the empirical work in Section 7.1 by estimating alternative econometric
models of company investment for the sample of state-owned firms29.   The models we
use are:   a modified version of the accelerator model estimated above,  an error
correction model, a “Q” investment model which uses the “fundamental Q” following
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and, finally, an Euler equation model.  Tables A1, A2,
A3 in the appendix report the results. All equations use the GMM first-differences
estimator.  We discuss here the results for the specification which investigates the soft
versus hard investment behaviour (column 2 in the tables).
We start from a modified version of the accelerator model in equation (5). As a
control for future investment opportunities, we use here the leads of firm real sales
growth instead of the leads of industry production growth. In order to include two leads
of sales growth in our model, we had to eliminate from the panel firms that did not
match the appropriate requirement for a dynamic specification (see section 6). As a
consequence we are left with 91 state firms with at least seven consecutive
observations. As table A1 shows, the leads of  firm sales do not work as well as the
future industry production, with only the first lead approaching significance. However,
the results regarding the role of cash flow across budget regimes and the business cycle
remain the same.  In particular, the main empirical finding that the cash flow term is
positive and highly significant only in the soft budget constraint period is supported by
the data.
We also estimate an error correction model of investment.  Table A2 reports the
GMM results.  The empirical model we have estimated follows Bond et al. (1997) and
takes the form:
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29 This strategy of checking thoroughly the robustness of results by providing a battery of estimations of
different investment models is along the lines of Bond et al. (1997) and Mairesse, Hall, Mulkay (1999).
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The advantage of this approach is that it retains (long run) information in the levels
of output and capital stock. Conversely, a potential disadvantage is that, when financial
terms are included, the model does not control for the possibility that  cash flow may be
a forecasting variable for the firm’s investment opportunities. The results in column (2)
show that the error correction mechanism works as expected – the coefficient for (kit-2 –
yit-2) is negative and significant, suggesting that when the capital stock is greater than
the desired level, the firm decreases the investment rate in the future (and viceversa).
Constant returns to scale are rejected, as shown by the significant coefficient on the
level of yit-2 30. The results for the role of cash flow across budget regimes again hold,
with the coefficient for cash flow in the soft period positive and highly significant and
the one for the hard period not significantly different from zero, although positive this
time.
For completeness, in a set of unreported regressions, we estimate the “Fundamental
Q” model proposed by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). Following this approach we
constructed an alternative proxy for  marginal Q, using a two-equation forecasting
model composed of (gross operating) profit to capital and sales to capital ratios31. By
including the fundamental Q in the investment equation, one can find whether the added
cash flow is an independent “fundamental” variable which explains investment (see, for
example, Hubbard 1998). In particular, our main findings on the cash flow terms are
consistent with the previous evidence. Cash flow enters positively in all specifications
and, more to the point, its coefficient is positive and significant only in the soft budget
constraint period, with a point estimate of 0.042.  Conversely, our measure of the
“fundamental Q” enters negatively in the investment equation. This result probably
shows that this approach is unsuitable for state-owned firms, with their wide-ranging
objectives including non-profit and counter-cyclical ones (see Section 3, see Chart 1).
Finally, we estimate an Euler equation model.  This, in principle, is the approach
that better accounts for the lack of stock market based information, although, in section
5 we noted that it may not be the most appropriate for state-owned firms.  We follow
the specification outlined in Bond and Meghir (1994)32 :
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30 These results are similar to those reported for the UK in the cross-country comparison by Bond et al.
(1997).
31 See Franzosi (1999) for an application to the private firms in the CERIS panel dataset.
32 See also Rondi, Sembenelli and Zanetti (1994) for an application to Italian company data.
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Pi is the gross operating profits (value added – labour costs). Yi is the firm’s output.
The derivation of the model shows that, in the absence of financial constraints, b1 ³
1, b2  ³ 1, b3 > 0 and (under constant returns to scale) b4  ³ 0. In table A3 we present the
empirical results that we obtained using the GMM SYSTEM estimator available in
DPD98 (Arellano and Bond, 1998) . As shown in Blundell and Bond (1998), the GMM
SYSTEM estimator helps to mitigate the weak instrument problem  that  may arise
when lagged levels of the endogenous variable are used as instruments for an equation
in first-differences (as in the standard GMM). By estimating a system of equations in
first differences and in levels (where lags of variables in levels and in first-differences
are used as instruments, respectively) it is shown that efficiency gains can be obtained,
particularly with short sample periods and persistent series33.
The results in table A3 show that the coefficients on the lagged investment terms
are correctly signed and significant, though smaller in absolute value than predicted by
the theory.  Regarding the cash flow and budget regimes, the interesting result here is
that our main results are confirmed:  the coefficient in column (2) on the gross operating
profits term when interacted with the soft budget period dummy is positive and
approaching significance, and its point estimate is much larger than the coefficient for
the hard period.  Regarding the interaction between cash flow and business cycle, the
specification in column (3) provide further interesting results. CF/Kit REC1t and CF/Kit
EXPt are both positive and significant and the former is significantly larger than the
latter. Conversely, the point coefficient for the later recession, CF/Kit REC2t, is not
statistically significant.  These results provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that
the correlation between investment and cash flow is counter-cyclical during the soft
period, suggesting abuse of managerial discretion (collusion between managers and
politicians, see Section 3). Moreover, the different results obtained for the first and
second recessions provide supporting evidence for the interpretation discussed in
Section 3.  When the budget constraint hardens, managers lose the room for manoeuvre
necessary to pursue discretionary (personal and party-political) objectives or to indulge
in vote-seeking behaviour  by politicians interested in exploiting the economic
downturn (see Chart 1). On the other hand, it may also be argued that they also lose the
possibility of pursuing constrained policy objectives, including counter-cyclical
investment and growth-oriented projects.
In conclusion, our main results regarding the interaction between cash flow and
budget regimes show robustness across the main investment models in the literature.
                                                
33 We have used the GMM SYSTEM estimator on other specifications in this paper and found
improvements in precision  on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in most cases, but
particularly in the estimation of the Euler equation.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°10/2000
32
8. Conclusions
This paper extends the literature on the impact of financial factors on company
investment to the case of public enterprises by investigating the correlation between their
investment and cash flow.  Understanding the interaction between financial factors and
public firms’ investment is particularly important for two policy-related reasons. On one
side, the dynamics and constraints of public investment play a crucial role in development
and growth, especially in developing and transition economies. On the other, investigating
how financial factors affect public firms’ investment - and in what way it differs from
private firms - is relevant for an understanding of what incentives could improve their
performance, of the regulatory mechanisms for privatised utilities and of the potential
effects of privatisation.
The distinctive element of the financial environment of public firms is the budget
regime under which they operate. This study tests whether the correlation between
investment and cash flow varies across soft and hard budget constraint regimes and also
over the business cycle.  Our empirical work contributes to the current debate in two ways.
First, it provides econometric evidence of the impact on the investment decisions of public
enterprises of a shift in budget regimes. In doing so, it also reveals the important role
played by European integration and, in particular, by the requirements for participating in
the European Single Market programme and for entering the European Monetary Union.
Second, it extends to public firms the investigation of those sources of capital markets
imperfections developed in the financial economics literature – i.e. the “asymmetric
information/financing constraints hypothesis” and the “managerial discretion/free cash
flow hypothesis” - that might be responsible for a positive correlation between investment
and cash flow.
The paper discusses the similarities between state-owned enterprises and widely-held
quoted firms in the context of this literature and argues that public enterprises can also be
afflicted by excessive managerial discretion. It also discusses how, due to the multiple
objectives of public firms and the related different context in which public managers
operate, this excessive discretion is related to constrained or discretionary objectives.  In
particular, among the discretionary objectives, the pursuit of party-political aims leads to
collusion between public managers and politicians.  We interpret collusion and corruption,
major obstacles in the efficient functioning of today’s public enterprises, as an abuse of
managerial discretion.
Our empirical approach consists in the estimation of an accelerator model of
investment, with additional cash flow terms, using an unbalanced panel of 150 state-owned
firms, operating in competitive industries, over the period 1977-1993.  Because of the
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complexities of public enterprises and because, to our knowledge, this is the first
investigation of these aspects of their investment behaviour, we check the robustness of our
findings to other model specifications used in this literature.  For each specification we allow
the coefficient on cash flow to vary across different sub-periods, testing for parameter
constancy. On the basis of our analysis of the Italian institutional context, we split our
sample period into a soft budget constraint period (1977-1987) and a hard budget constraint
period (1988-1993). Moreover, we explore the interaction between budget regime and
business cycle, exploiting the fact that our sample includes a full business cycle with the first
recession falling during the soft budget years and the second during the hard budget years.
Our main results show that both the shift in the budget regime and the fluctuations in
the business cycle have an impact on state firms’ investment decisions. They may be
summarised as follows:
i. We find that the established empirical finding for private firms - that investment is
positively correlated with cash flow - holds also for public enterprises;
ii. We find that there is a difference in this correlation during soft and hard budget
regimes.  The coefficient in the soft period is positive and highly significant,
confirming the hypothesis of a high degree of managerial discretion in the soft regime.
It is also significantly larger than the cash flow coefficient in the hard budget regime
period.  This coefficient, however, is not significantly different from zero, showing
that, when the financing constraints for public enterprises become tighter and public
managers’ discretion decreases, that link is no longer there.
iii. We find that there is some evidence of a counter-cyclical investment cash-flow relationship
during the soft budget constraint regime. In other words, the vote-seeking collusion
between public managers and politicians characterises the first recession in the soft budget
period, but not the second recession which falls during the hard budget period.
iv. We find that the empirical findings supporting the hypothesis of excessive managerial
discretion in the soft budget constraint period are robust to a number of other specifications,
the error correction model, the Euleur approach and the “fundamental Q” approach.
In conclusion, our results show that, under the soft budget regime, the investment-cash
flow relationship for this panel of Italian public enterprises is consistent with the “managerial
discretion hypothesis”.  And the shift from a soft to a hard budget regime brings about an
important change in the investment decisions of public enterprises, with managers losing the
discretion necessary to indulge in collusion, empire building and wasteful investment.
These findings are important empirical evidence of the effectiveness and political
trade-offs of a switch of government budget regime and also of the indirect, but
nonetheless strong, impact of the European Single Market programme and the European
Monetary Union on the behaviour of  public enterprises.
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Private Firms with severe agency problems: MD pro-cyclical and  I-CF
correlation pro-cyclical
Public Firms with Soft Budget Constraint: I-CF  counter-cyclical
Figure 1 - Managerial Discretion and the  Investment-Cash Flow
Relationship over the Business Cycle for Private and Public Firms
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Table 1a - Summary statistics for firm characteristics: 150 state-owned firms
Full Period Soft Budget
Period
Hard Budget
Period
Recession
1981-82
Expansion Recession
1990-93
Total Sample
(1977-1993) n. obs. 1278 924 354 183 896 199
Estimation Sample
(1981-1993) n. obs. 678 426 252 137 386 155
I/K
I Quartile 0.053 0.054 0.048 0.054 0.055 0.054
Median 0.088 0.084 0.093 0.104 0.083 0.091
III Quartile 0.139 0.143 0.132 0.197 0.126 0.133
CF/K
I Quartile -0.098 -0.114 -0.062 -0.234 -0.057 -0.104
Median 0.033 0.021 0.045 -0.039 0.043 0.037
III Quartile 0.096 0.098 0.092 0.092 0.098 0.089
Table 1b - Summary statistics for firm characteristics: 1168 private firms
Full Period Soft Budget
Period
Hard Budget
Period
Recession
1981-82
Expansion Recession
1990-93
Total Sample
(1977-1993) n. obs. 9877 5611 4266 994 6254 2629
Estimation Sample
(1981-1993) n. obs. 5205 2268 2937 542 2595 2068
I/K
I Quartile 0.050 0.052 0.048 0.054 0.053 0.046
Median 0.087 0.088 0.085 0.089 0.089 0.082
III Quartile 0.131 0.132 0.130 0.150 0.128 0.132
CF/K
I Quartile 0.029 0.034 0.027 -0.287 0.051 0.016
Median 0.090 0.106 0.080 0.074 0.110 0.071
III Quartile 0.162 0.181 0.142 0.170 0.180 0.133
Legend:
I/K: Investment to Capital Stock ratio
CF/K: Cash Flow to Capital Stock ratio
Soft Budget Period: 1977-1987
Hard Budget Period: 1988-1993
Expansion: 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989
"Soft" Recession: 1981-82; "Hard" Recession: 1990-91-92-93
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Table 2 - Investment equations: 150 state-owned firms
GMM estimates in first differences
Dependent variable (I/K)it
(1) (2) (3)
(I/K)it-1 0.142 0.158 0.162
(1.712) (1.921) (1.823)
Dyit 0.125 0.064 0.061
(3.042) (1.630) (1.562)
Dyit-1 -0.036 -0.035 -0.030
(-1.400) (-1.316) (-1.185)
Dyit-2 0.036 0.041 0.042
(1.597) (1.876) (2.055)
Dyjt+1 0.120 0.102 0.095
(1.792) (1.630) (1.478)
Dyjt+2 0.245 0.304 0.322
(1.707) (1.862) (2.094)
(C/K)it 0.038 - -
(2.530) - -
(C/K)it-1 0.010 - -
(0.641) - -
(C/K)it· SOFTt - 0.077 -
- (2.016) -
(C/K)it· HARD t - -0.081 -
- (-0.862) -
(C/K)it· REC1t - - 0.072
- - (0.414)
(C/K)it· EXP t - - 0.050
- - (1.818)
(C/K)it· REC2t - - -0.053
- - (-0.518)
M1 -3.289 [113] -3.373 [113] -3.884 [113]
M2 -1.069 [  91] -0.927 [  91] -0.811 [  91]
Sargan
p value
77.3 [  74]
(0.37)
61.4 [  54]
(0.23)
64.7 [  56]
(0.20)
Instruments for col. (1): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm C/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Instruments for col. (2): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), DC/Kt-2 · SOFTt, DC/Kt-3 · SOFTt-1, DC/Kt-2 ·
HARDt, DC/Kt-3 · HARDt-1, Ct-2 · SOFTt, Ct-2 · HARDt, Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Instruments for col. (3): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), DC/Kt-2 · REC1t, DC/Kt-3 · REC1t-1,
DC/Kt-2 · EXPt, DC/Kt-3 · EXPt-1, DC/Kt-2 · REC2t, DC/Kt-3 · REC2t-1,
Ct-2 · REC1t, Ct-2 · EXPt, Ct-2 · REC2t, Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Legend:
One-step estimates. T-statistics in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series
and cross-section heteroskedasticity.
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table 3 - Investment equations: 1168 private firms
GMM estimates in first differences
Dependent variable (I/K)it
(1) (2) (3)
(I/K)it-1 0.142 0.164 0.121
(3.071) (3.576) (2.683)
Dyit 0.360 0.359 0.310
(4.227) (3.790) (3.526)
Dyit-1 0.039 0.041 0.036
(1.812) (1.879) (1.751)
Dyit-2 0.043 0.042 0.040
(2.341) (2.226) (2.288)
Dyjt+1 -0.025 -0.019 -0.010
(-0.595) (-0.435) (-0.239)
Dyjt+2 0.079 0.080 0.085
(1.744) (1.718) (1.872)
(C/K)it 0.036 - -
(6.420) - -
(C/K)it-1 -0.002 - -
(-9.783) - -
(C/K)it· SOFTt - 0.027 -
- (0.801) -
(C/K)it· HARDt - 0.011 -
- (2.136) -
(C/K)it· REC1t - - 0.267
- - (7.228)
(C/K)it· EXPt - - -0.029
- - (-1.313)
(C/K)it· REC2t - - 0.039
- - (9.006)
M1 -6.450 [926] -6.416 [926] -6.610 [926]
M2 1.841 [745] 2.081 [745] 1.800 [745]
Sargan
p value
81.7 [  75]
(0.28)
65.6 [  55]
(0.16)
67.2 [  57]
(0.17)
Instruments for col. (1): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm C/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-1, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Instruments for col. (2): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), DC/Kt-2 · SOFTt, DC/Kt-3 · SOFTt-1, DCF/Kt-2 · HARD t,
DC/Kt-3 · HARDt-1, Ct-2 · SOFT t, Ct-2 · HARDt, Dyjt-1, Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Instruments for col. (3): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm Ki (2,3), DCF/Kt-2 · REC1t, DC/Kt-3 · REC1t-1,
DC/Kt-2 · EXPt, DC/Kt-3 · EXPt-1, DC/Kt-2 · REC2t, DC/Kt-3 · REC2t-1,
Ct-2 · REC1t, Ct-2 · EXPt, Ct-2 · REC2t, Dyjt-1, Dyit-2, Dyit-3, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3
Legend:
One-step estimates. T-statistics in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series
and cross-section heteroskedasticity.
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 - Investment equations: 91 state-owned firms (Leads of Real Sales Growth)
Sample period 1983-1993
GMM estimates in first differences
Dependent variable (I/K)it
(1) (2) (3)
(I/K)it-1 0.096 0.092 0.098
(1.174) (1.145) (0.986)
Dyit 0.120 0.119 0.139
(1.742) (1.652) (1.721)
Dyit-1 -0.034 -0.044 -0.033
(-1.006) (-1.203) (-0.851)
Dyit-2 0.046 0.038 0.044
(1.470) (1.343) (1.477)
Dyit+1 0.024 0.055 0.050
(0.413) (1.140) (0.874)
Dyit+2 -0.005 0.012 -0.024
(-0.082) (0.189) (-0.277)
(C/K)it 0.056 - -
(3.148) - -
(C/K)it-1 -0.020 - -
(-0.516) - -
(C/K)it· SOFTt - 0.060 -
- (3.189) -
(C/K)it· HARD t - -0.132 -
- (-0.933) -
(C/K)it· REC1t - - 0.113
- - (0.348)
(C/K)it· EXP t - - 0.064
- - (4.950)
(C/K)it· REC2t - - -0.090
- - (-0.400)
M1 -2.061 [  71] -2.092 [  71] -2.425 [  71]
M2 -1.425 [  61] -1.332 [  61] -1.316 [  61]
Sargan
p value
50.8 [  43]
(0.19)
56.0 [  49]
(0.23)
52.9 [  46]
(0.23)
Instruments for col. (1): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm ki (2,3), C/Kit-2, C/Kit-3, Dyjt-1, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3, Dyit-2, Dyit-3
Instruments for col. (2): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm ki, (2,3), DC/Kt-2 · SOFTt, DC/Kt-3 · SOFTt-1, DC/Kt-2 ·
HARDt, DC/Kt-3 · HARDt-1, Ct-2 · SOFTt, Ct-3 · SOFTt-1, Ct-2 · HARDt, Ct-3 ·
HARDt-1, Dyjt-1, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3, Dyit-2, Dyit-3
Instruments for col. (3): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm ki, (2,3), DC/Kt-2 · REC1t, DC/Kt-3 · REC1t-1, DC/Kt-2 ·
EXPt, DC/Kt-3 · EXPt-1, DC/Kt-2 · REC2t, DC/Kt-3 · REC2t-1, Ct-2 · REC1t, Ct-3 ·
REC1t-1, Ct-2 · EXPt, Ct-3 · EXPt-1, Ct-2 · REC2t, Ct-3 · REC2t-1, Dyjt-1, Dyjt-2, Dyjt-3,
Dyit-2, Dyit-3
Legend:
One-step estimates. T-statistics in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series
and cross-section heteroskedasticity.
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table A2 - Investment equations: 150 state-owned firms (Error Correction Models)
GMM estimates in first differences
Dependent variable (I/K)it
(1) (2) (3)
(I/K)it-1 -0.146 -0.107 -0.130
(-1.607) (-1.089) (-1.849)
Dyit -0.006 0.007 -0.021
(-0.118) (0.110) (-0.363)
Dyit-1 -0.184 -0.114 -0.154
(-1.879) (-1.744) (-1.880)
kit-2-yit-2 -0.217 -0.197 -0.233
(-4.137) (-3.854) (-4.506)
yit-2 -0.332 -0.234 -0.332
(-2.772) (-2.986) (-3.515)
(C/K)it 0.038 - -
(3.159) - -
(C/K)it-1 0.030 - -
(2.338) - -
(C/K)it· SOFTt - 0.081 -
- (2.397) -
(C/K)it· HARD t - 0.041 -
- (0.884) -
(C/K)it· REC1t - - 0.170
- - (2.123)
(C/K)it· EXP t - - 0.017
- - (0.395)
(C/K)it· REC2t - - -0.044
- - (-0.529)
M1 -2.980 [113] -2.662 [113] -3.701 [113]
M2 -0.896 [  91] -1.022 [  91] -0.843 [  91]
Sargan
p value
68.1 [  71]
(0.57)
48.0 [  49]
(0.51)
50.8 [  50]
(0.44)
Instruments for col. (1): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (k-y)i (2,3), Gmm C/Ki (2,3).
Instruments for col. (2): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (k-y)i (2,3), C/Kt-2 · SOFTt, C/Kt-3 · SOFTt-1,
C/Kt-2 · HARDt, C/Kt-3 · HARDt-1
Instruments for col. (3): Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (k-y)i (2,3), C/Kt-2 · REC1t, C/Kt-3 · REC1t-1,
C/Kt-2 · EXPt, C/Kt-3 · EXPt-1, C/Kt-2 · REC2t, C/Kt-3 · REC2t-1
Legend:
One-step estimates. T-statistics in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series
and cross-section heteroskedasticity.
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table A3 - Investment equations: 150 state-owned firms (Euler Equation Models)
GMM SYSTEM estimates in first differences
Dependent variable (I/K)it
(1) (2) (3)
(I/K)t-1 0.586 0.593 0.758
(1.865) (1.837) (2.434)
(I/K)2t-1 -0.168 -0.171 -0.203
(-1.539) (-1.521) (-1.725)
(Y/K)t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.004
(0.111) (0.087) (-1.146)
(P/K)t-1 0.032 - -
(1.251) - -
(P/K)t-1 · SOFTt - 0.033 -
- (1.293) -
(P/K)t-1 · HARDt - -0.031 -
- (-0.332) -
(P/K)t-1 · REC1t - - 0.309
- - (4.414)
(P/K)t-1 · EXPt - - 0.033
- - (1.945)
(P/K)t-1 · REC2t - - -0.040
- - (-0.582)
M1 -2.090 [113] -2.098 [113] -2.440 [113]
M2 -0.016 [  91] -0.007 [  91] -0.606 [  91]
Sargan
p value
125.0 [109]
(0.14)
122.4 [108]
(0.16)
118.7 [107]
(0.21)
Instruments for col. (1): Equations in first differences: Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (I/K)
2
i (2,3),
Gmm P/Ki (2,3), Y/Kit-2, Y/Kit-3, kit-2, kit-3 , yit-2, yit-3. Equations in levels: DI/Kit-1, (I/K)2it-1
Instruments for col. (2): Equations in first differences: Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (I/K)
2
i (2,3),
Gmm P/Ki (2,3), Y/Kit-2, Y/Kit-3, kit-2, kit-3 , yit-2, yit-3. Equations in levels: DI/Kit-1, (I/K)2it-1
Instruments for col. (3): Equations in first differences: Gmm I/Ki (2,3), Gmm (I/K)
2
i (2,3),
Gmm P/Ki (2,3), Y/Kit-2, Y/Kit-3, kit-2, kit-3 , yit-2, yit-3. Equations in levels: DI/Kit-1, (I/K)2it-1
Legend:
One-step estimates. T-statistics in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series
and cross-section heteroskedasticity.
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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